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There has traditionally been a symbiotic link between new business ventures and new banking 
ventures.  This article finds that the traditional link between small businesses and small banks – 
the small business loan – has weakened in recent years.  While new banks have intensified their 
reliance on small business customers, small business borrowers have become less reliant on 
small banks for their credit needs.  These findings are consistent with rapid changes in the 
structure of the banking industry, financial instruments and markets, and communications and 
information technology over the past two decades. 
 
Introduction 
 Entrepreneurs running small businesses, and especially entrepreneurs starting up a new 
business, have limited financing options.  The cornerstone financing, equity capital, typically 
comes from the personal savings of the entrepreneur that organized and manages the firm, or 
from outside investors who know the entrepreneur.  As time passes, however, successful 
business start-ups become increasingly able to complement their equity capital with debt.  For 
most small business start-ups, the primary provider of this debt financing is a small, locally 
based, community bank. 
 Community banks have traditionally been well-suited to evaluate the risks of lending to 
small businesses.  Because of its local geographic focus, the typical community bank has at least 
two potential advantages over large banks headquartered outside of the local market.  First, the 
very nature of its daily business – monitoring local business loans, talking with local government 
officials, observing activity in the checking accounts of local businesses and consumers – keeps 
the community bank in continuous contact with a web of local economic players, and provides 
the community bank with a storehouse of knowledge in real time about local business conditions 
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and prospects.  Second, by virtue of its business strategy, a community bank has a financial stake 
in the local community, which creates an incentive to build long-lasting relationships with its 
local clients.  When a community bank makes a loan to a small local business, it leverages its 
stock of information about the local economy during the underwriting process; it adds to that 
stock of information as it monitors the activity of these borrowers; and it establishes a 
relationship with a client which may purchase additional financial services from the bank in the 
future.     
 Two broad sets of forces are threatening to erode community banks‟ traditional 
advantages at small business lending.  First, recent advances in financial, information, and 
communications technologies are allowing large banks, thrifts, and finance companies with little 
specialized knowledge of the local economy to profitably underwrite loans to small businesses.  
Essentially, these lenders are substituting information technology for local information: they can 
use the Internet to inexpensively generate loan applications; they can evaluate those applications 
using credit scoring models; and they are large enough to diversify away idiosyncratic credit risk 
by making large numbers of loans in many different geographic markets.  Second, deregulation 
of the banking industry has allowed large out-of-state banks to physically enter any local market 
in the country, typically by acquiring a local bank.  Being “on the ground” in the local market 
arguably gives these large, out-of-state banks access to the same local information as the 
community banks. 
 But not all large acquisitive banks choose to compete head-to-head with local banks for 
small business customers.  It is not unusual for large bank entrants to de-emphasize the small 
business part of the banks they acquire – either not renewing these loans or unfavorably altering 
the terms of these loans – in favor of using the acquired bank mainly as a retail outlet.  These 
small businesses are left to search for new credit relationships, and this has been an important 
factor driving the increase in new bank start-ups in the U.S. since the mid-1990s.  These new 
start-up banks are too small to make large loans, and they are typically run by refugee officers 
from acquired banks whose comparative advantage is their knowledge of the local business 
environment.  Hence, out of necessity, new start-up banks are typically launched with small 
business lending strategies. 
 The relationship between small banks and small businesses – and especially between new 
bank start-ups and new businesses start-ups – can be characterized as symbiotic.  But this 
symbiosis may be sensitive to advances in information processing and financial technologies.  
This article analyzes data on small business lending between 1993 and 2001, and finds evidence 
that the nature of the symbiotic credit link between new banks and small businesses has 
deteriorated in recent years.  Both new banks and small banks have grown more reliant on small 
business clients, but small business borrowers have become less reliant on these banks for their 
credit needs.  These findings are consistent with the evolving structure of the banking industry, 
the development of new financial instruments and markets, and advances in communications and 
information technology over the past two decades.   
 
I.  The Symbiotic Relationship Between Business Ventures and Banking Ventures  
 This section provides some expanded background information on the symbiotic lending 
relationships discussed above.  Section I.A summarizes the findings of Berger and Udell (1998) 
on the financing mix at small businesses.  Section I.B reviews the reasons that community banks 
tend to focus on small business lending.  Section I.C discusses the entry strategies of newly 
chartered commercial banks. 
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I.A  Financing new business start-ups 
Small businesses in the U.S. receive a substantial part of their financing from commercial 
bank loans, and this credit is especially important for new businesses that survive beyond their 
first two years of operation.  Using data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business 
Finance, which defines a small business as an enterprise with less than 500 full-time employees, 
Berger and Udell (1998) showed that three distinctly different sources accounted for three-
quarters of the financing at the typical U.S. small business.  The primary owners of the firm 
provided about 35% of funding, mostly in the form of equity ownership (about 31%) with a 
small portion coming from personal loans and credit card debt.  Loans from financial institutions 
provided about 25% of funding, mostly from commercial banks (about 19%).  Suppliers 
provided about 16% of funding through trade credits.   
The financing mix at small businesses tends to vary with both the size of the firm and 
with the age of the firm.  On average, very small firms (those with less than 20 FTEs and less 
than $1 million in annual sales) relied more heavily on insider funds, receiving 51% of their 
funding from their primary owners, compared to only 21% from financial institutions and 12% 
from trade credit.  Small businesses above this size threshold used relatively more outsider 
funding, receiving only 31% of their funding from their primary owners, but 28% from financial 
institutions and 17% from trade credit.       
These size-based differences in financing mix are consistent with the life cycle of small 
businesses.  As a new business grows older it also tends to grow larger.  Because older, larger 
businesses are less informationally opaque they are better credit risks than younger, smaller 
businesses, and as a result they are better able to secure financing from third parties.  Older and 
larger firms make more frequent transactions with an expanded set of venders and customers; 
they have longer and more complete financial track records; and the very fact that they did not 
fail early in their lives suggests that they are (relatively) good risks to survive into the future. 
Having access to debt financing through bank loans or trade credit makes it easier for owners to 
grow their firms without having sell a portion of their equity stakes.  
Bank loans are especially important as new businesses mature from their infancy through 
their adolescence.  Commercial bank loans comprised only about 16% of total financing for 
small firms that were less than 2 years old; 31% for small firms that were between 2 and 4 years 
old; and 18% for small firms that were more than 4 years old.  The increase in loans up to year 4 
is consistent with reduced informational opaqueness as new firms grow older.  The decline in 
loans after year 4 suggests that successful business start-ups are able to reduce their financial 
leverage (and their financial risk) as they mature.  Less than half of all new businesses survive 
beyond their fourth year – those that survive beyond that are likely to be profitable firms with 
lots of retained earnings, which can be used to reduce debt financing.   
 
I.B  Small business lending at community banks  
The typical small business is closely held, does not issue publicly traded securities, and 
tends to do business with a limited number of suppliers and customers.  As a result, the financial 
information needed to make and monitor a small business loan must be gleaned from a first hand 
relationship with that firm.  Community banks have a number of comparative advantages over 
larger banks at forming these relationships, and this is reflected on community bank balance 
sheets where a disproportionate amount of commercial loans are made to small businesses.   
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Community banks tend to have a very tight geographic focus.  Although this limits 
opportunities for diversification and growth, this localness has advantages for small business 
lending.  Community banks gather most of their deposits locally and make most of their loans to 
local borrowers, so they benefit from informational synergies – that is, they acquire substantial 
amounts of useful information simply because their local business and retail customers make 
transactions with each other.  In addition, community banks can monitor their business loans 
more frequently because they are located relatively close to their customers.  Finally, the 
decentralized organizational structure of the typical community bank encourages relationships to 
grow between loan officers and small business clients; in contrast, large banks with extensive 
branching networks often used a centralized decision-making process, and branch managers are 
frequently rotated from branch to branch.   
Government regulations reinforce community banks‟ informational, locational, and 
organizational advantages at making small business loans.  Federal bank regulators have 
historically prevented national banks from extending unsecured loans to individual business 
borrowers in amounts that exceed 15% of bank capital.
1
  To make a $1 million business loan (the 
largest loan recognized by regulators as a small business loan) to a single borrower, a community 
bank with a fairly typical 8% ratio of equity capital-to-assets would have to have total assets of at 
least $83 million.  This is a binding threshold for new start-up banks.  Furthermore, this 
regulation precludes most established community banks from making loans to large business 
customers: for example, a bank has to have over $400 million of assets to make a single loan of 
$5 million.  
Community banks can avoid loan concentration limits simply by growing larger.  A 
number of studies find strong negative relationships between bank size and the proportion of 
bank assets invested in small business loans.
2
  The quickest way for a community bank to grow 
is to acquire another community bank.  Note, however, that small business lending does not 
always decline after two banks merge.  These studies find that small business lending is unlikely 
to decline when both merger partners are small banks, and regardless of bank size, small 
business lending is unlikely to decline when it is an important part of the acquiring bank‟s pre-
merger business strategy. 
 
I.C  Small business lending at start-up banks 
Over the past forty years there have been three major surges in bank chartering activity in 
the U.S.  The first wave came in the early 1970s, a second wave followed in the mid-1980s, and 
a third wave occurred in the late-1990s.  At their peaks, each of these „de novo‟ bank waves was 
increasing the population of commercial banks by about 2.5% per year (DeYoung 1999).   
The timing of the waves coincided with changes in economic conditions, financial 
regulations, and industry structure over time.  For example, the second and third waves 
correspond roughly with economic expansions, and the trough that separates them corresponds 
roughly with the banking crisis of the late-1980s and a macroeconomic recession in the early 
1990s.  In addition, the second and third waves correspond roughly with the deregulation of 
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interstate banking: a large number of state governments repealed unit banking laws and formed 
interstate banking compacts during the 1980s, and in the mid-1990s the federal government 
passed and implemented the Riegle-Neal Act which allowed banks to branch across state lines 
anywhere in the country.  These deregulations resulted in thousands of geographic-expansion 
mergers in which large banking companies acquired smaller, more locally focused banks in other 
states.   
As alluded to above in Section 1, geographic-expansion mergers can be good predictors 
of new bank start-ups.  Berger, Goldberg, and White (2001) and Keeton (2000) both find 
systematic evidence that new banks are significantly more likely to start up in local markets that 
have recently experienced entry by acquisition.  It is not unusual for an acquiring bank to 
institute changes in lending policies at the bank it acquires, or to institute cost-cutting programs 
to improve the performance of the target bank.  It is also not unusual for loan officers at the 
acquired local bank (who have specialized knowledge of the local business community) to 
become unhappy with the new lending policy, for these lending officers to get terminated as part 
of the cost-cutting program, or for the clients of the acquired bank to become disenchanted.  
Under these circumstances it is relatively easy for new start-up banks to enter the market, 
because loan officers with valuable connections to the local business community are available 
for hire, and profitable small business accounts are looking to switch to a new bank.  Hence, new 
banks often enter the market with ready-made connections with small business clients, and as a 
result their initial loan portfolios are more heavily weighted toward small business loans than at 
established community banks.   
The magnitude of this effect was illustrated in a study by DeYoung (1998), who 
examined the lending behavior of relatively young U.S. commercial banks during the mid-1990s.    
Figure 1 is constructed using data from the original study.  For the typical 1-year old commercial 
bank, the ratio of small business loans to total loans was about 27%, while at small established 
banks this ratio was only about 13.5%.  These data indicate a relatively long-lasting difference, 
not just a short-run entry strategy.  As late as 14 years after start-up, the intensity of small 
business lending at the average start-up bank was still 50% higher than at the typical small 
established bank.  DeYoung (1998) and DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) ran more 
rigorous tests of the data in Figure 1 that carefully accounted for the effects of bank age, bank 
size, and other determinants of lending strategies.  Both studies confirmed the basic result – as in 
the raw data, the intensity of small business lending at de novo banks starts out high, and 
decreases very slowly over time as these new banks mature.   
 
II.  A Changing Environment for Lending to Small Businesses 
 This section provides a brief analysis of ongoing changes in the banking industry that are 
likely to affect the relationships between banks and small business customers, and by extension 
the supply of credit to small businesses.  These changes affect the geographic structure of the 
banking industry, the competitive conditions faced by banks, the information and 
communications technologies used by banks, and the business strategies used by banks.  The 
discussion draws in part on earlier analysis by DeYoung (2000), Hunter (2001), and DeYoung 
and Hunter (2001).   
 
II.A  Geographic change   
The repeal of federal and state restrictions on interstate banking eliminated the barriers to 
geographic mobility which had artificially limited the size of U.S. banking companies.  Although 
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geographic expansion has proceeded more slowly than many had predicted (for example, as of 
2002 there is still no truly „nationwide‟ retail bank in the U.S.), many banks have grown 
substantially larger in a relatively short period of time by acquiring other banks.   
The most visible bank mergers are „megamergers‟ between two large and well-known 
institutions.  In 1998 alone, Bank of America merged with NationsBank to create a $580 billion 
bank; Banc One merged with First Chicago to create a $231 billion bank; and Wells Fargo 
merged with Norwest to create a $190 billion bank.  But megamergers are the exception to the 
rule: approximately 95 percent of the nearly 9,000 mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. banks 
since 1980 have involved at least one community bank.  As a result, the number of large banks 
has remained relatively constant in the U.S., but the number of small community banks (less than 
$500 million in assets) has declined by nearly 50 percent. 
Mergers have had two profound effects on behavior within banks.  First, increasing the 
geographic reach of banking company can make it more difficult to manage.  Berger and 
DeYoung (2001) show that the average distance between commercial bank affiliates with at least 
$100 million in assets and their holding company headquarters increased from about 160 miles in 
1985 to about 290 miles in 1998.  Moreover, their findings suggest that the increased distances 
between bank affiliates and their headquarters managers are associated with internal control 
problems.  Solutions to these control problems – like imposing strong, centralized management 
structures – may hinder the ability of lending officers at the local affiliates of large banks to 
develop relationships with small business borrowers.  Second, mergers have intensified 
competition in local markets.  A number of recent studies conclude that local banks tend to 
operate at higher levels of efficiency after one of their local competitors is acquired by an out-of-
market bank.
3
  There are a number of potential explanations for this phenomenon.  After the new 
owners take over, they often replace underperforming managers, reallocate assets to higher 
yielding investments, slash expenses, introduce new products and services, cut fees, raise deposit 
rates, or make numerous other changes that increase competitive rivalry in the local market.  
Local banks either respond in kind or lose market share to the new entrant.   
 
II.B  Technological change   
Banks also face increased competition from a variety of relatively new non-banking 
institutions.  For example, mutual funds have provided bank depositors with an array of 
alternative vehicles for savings and liquidity.  Similarly, the commercial paper market has 
provided new financing options for banks‟ most creditworthy customers, and the junk bond 
market has provided new financing options for banks‟ riskier customers.     
Faced with losing market share in their traditional lines of business, banks have 
responded with new business strategies based on new financial technologies.  Banks have 
learned how to use their increasingly scarce funds more efficiently by securitizing their loans 
rather than holding them in portfolio.  Banks have continued to earn revenues from business 
clients who switch from bank loans to commercial paper financing by selling them back-up lines 
of credit.  And banks have made themselves relatively more attractive to depositors by offering 
the increased convenience of ATM machines, Internet banking, and access to a broader array of 
third-party mutual funds.   
To a large degree, these competitive responses have shifted the composition of bank 
revenue away from interest income and toward noninterest income.  A securitized lending 
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strategy generates little interest income because the loans are not held for long on the books, but 
it generates increased noninterest income (e.g., loan origination fees) because the volume of 
loans that are underwritten typically increases.  Similarly, back-up lines of credit generate fee 
income, as do ATM networks from third-party access fees.  These competitive responses are 
more pronounced at large banks, which have the capacity to originate large volumes of 
securitizable loans (e.g., mortgage loans, credit card loans) and the investment capital necessary 
to deploy widespread ATM networks.   
Given their small size and local clientele, community banks are less able and/or less 
willing to embrace these new banking technologies.  But the adoption of these new technologies 
by large banks may  provide some opportunities for community banks.  For example, the 
idiosyncratic nature of small business lending relationships is in many ways inconsistent with 
automated lending technologies.  As a result, shifts in large bank strategies toward credit scoring 
and securitization may increase small community banks‟ advantages at traditional relationship-
based lending.   
 
II.C  Strategic change   
DeYoung (2000) and DeYoung and Hunter (2001) use a strategic map like the one shown 
in Figure 2 to analyze the past two decades of change in the banking industry.  The unit costs of 
producing banking services is measured vertically, and the degree to which banks differentiate 
the (actual or perceived) quality of their products and services is measured horizontally.  The 
circles represent individual banks: the circle positions indicate the combination of unit costs and 
product differentiation selected by the banks, and the circle sizes indicate bank size.  
Prior to industry deregulation, both large banks and small banks were clustered together 
near the northeast corner of the strategy space.  Large banks tended to have larger commercial 
accounts than small banks, but the differences in bank size weren‟t so much a strategic choice as 
a reflection of the size of the local market and the restrictiveness of local branching rules.  Small 
banks tended to offer more person-to-person service than large banks, but this wasn‟t so much a 
strategic choice as a reflection of the difficulty of delivering high-touch personal service as an 
organization grows larger.   
Deregulation and new financial technologies created incentives for large banks to become 
less like small banks.  Banks used mergers to get larger, capturing economies of scale that drove 
down their unit costs and gave them access to the new production and distribution technologies.  
These changes drove a „strategic wedge‟ between the large growing banks on one hand and the 
smaller community banks on the other hand.  Large banks moved in a southwest direction on the 
map, sacrificing personalized service in exchange for large scale production of standardized 
financial products at low unit costs.  Most community banks have remained relatively small and 
continued to operate at high unit costs, but their more personalized approach to financial services 
(e.g., small business lending) allows them to charge higher prices that offset their cost 
disadvantages. 
 
III.  Empirical analysis 
This section presents new evidence that the symbiotic relationship historically enjoyed by 
new bank start-ups and small businesses has weakened in recent years.  Section III.A presents 
the empirical model.  Section III.B describes the data.  Section III.C presents the test results.  
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III.A  Empirical model 
The tests performed here extend the analysis of DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) 
on the small business lending behavior of newly chartered commercial banks.  Equation (1) is a 
variant of the main regression equation estimated in that study: 
 
            SBL/ASSETSi,t   =      +  *AGEi,t  +  *AGEi,t*POST94i  +  *ASSETSi,t   
+  *ASSETSi,t*POST94i  +  *POST94i 
+  1*LOANS/ASSETSi,t  +  2*ASSETGROWTHi,t  
+  3*MBHCi,t  +  4*YEAR1MBHCi  +  5*HERFINDAHLi,t 
+  6*YEAR DUMMIESt  +  i,t    
 (1) 
where the subscripts i and t are indexes for banks and time, respectively.  The dependent variable 
SBL/ASSETS is the ratio of small business loans-to-total bank assets.  As discussed above, 
previous research indicates that small business lending at newly chartered banks tends to decline 
as new banks mature (AGE) and also tends to decline as new banks get larger (ASSETS).  The 
dummy variable POST94 is included to test whether these age and size effects were different for 
the generation of new bank start-ups chartered after 1994, described above in Section 2 as the 
“third wave” of de novo banks.  These banks began their lives in an environment where new 
technology, deregulated markets, and intensified competition may have eroded the symbiotic 
relationship between new banks and small businesses.           
The remainder of the right-hand-side variables are included as controls.  The coefficient 
on the ratio of loans-to-assets (LOANS/ASSETS) is expected to be positive, because when a new 
bank expands its investment in loans (as opposed to its investments in securities), a substantial 
portion of these loans are likely to be small business loans.  Similarly, the coefficient on annual 
asset growth (ASSETGROWTH) is expected to be positive.  The coefficient on the multibank 
holding company dummy (MBHC) is expected to be negative, because banks that are affiliates in 
large multibank organizations are less likely than independent banks to make small business 
relationship loans.  Similarly, banks that began their lives as affiliates in multibank holding 
companies (as opposed to becoming affiliates via acquisition later on) are expected to make 
fewer small business loans.  The coefficient on local market concentration (HERFINDAHL) is 
expected to be negative, based on the Petersen and Rajan (1995) finding that banks are more 
likely to invest in a new loan relationship when the probability of the borrower switching to a 
different bank in the future is low.  The equation also includes a vector of fixed effect YEAR 
dummies to control for the effects of general economic conditions on small business lending.      
Alternative versions of equation (1) are estimated using slightly different definitions for 
two of the regression variables.  The dependent variable SBL/ASSETS is replaced by the ratio of 
small business loans-to-total loans (SBL/LOANS) in some regressions, and the dummy variable 
POST94 is replaced by the dummy variable POST89 in other regressions.  All regressions are 
estimated using ordinary least squares.        
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III.B  Data 
The data used in this study come from the Statements of Condition and Income (the call 
reports).  Starting in 1993, the call reports began to include data on the number and volume of 
small business loans made by all commercial banks.  The call reports include several alternative 
definitions for small business loans – this study defines a small business loan (SBL) as a 
commercial and industrial loan with an original principal of less than $1 million. Using this 
definition, the call reports indicate that there has been a striking change in the distribution of 
small business lending across different sizes of commercial banks since 1993.  In 1993, about 
63% of all small business loans were held by banks with less than $10 billion in assets.  By 2001, 
about 60% of all small business loans were held by banks with greater than $10 billion in assets.  
(These figures exclude loans held by rural banks, and are corrected for inflation.)  This simple 
comparison may be evidence that the comparative advantage of community banks in gathering 
information on small business borrowers has eroded over time, and that larger banks have been 
able to use their access to new information technologies to increase their market share of small 
business loans.      
Although increasing numbers of small business borrowers were turning to large banks for 
credit, small banks were becoming more reliant on small business loan customers.  In 1993, the 
average values of SBL/ASSETS and SBL/LOANS for banks with under $500 million in assets 
were, respectively, about 6% and 10%.  By 2001, these percentages had increased to about 10% 
and 15%, respectively.  (The comparable percentages for banks with over $10 billion in assets 
remained relatively flat over this time period, at about 3% and 5%, respectively.)   
The factor that reconciles these two phenomena is the declining number of small banks.  
Between 1993 and 2001, the number of small community banks (i.e., banks with less than $500 
million in assets) in the U.S. declined by one-third, from almost 7,500 banks to around 5,000 
banks.        
Equation (1) is estimated using an unbalanced panel of annual data drawn from the call 
reports between 1993 and 2001.  To be included in this data panel, a bank had to be located in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), had to be between 1 and 20-years old, had to have positive 
amounts of loans and assets, and complete data for all of the regression variables had to be 
available for the bank.  All variables are observed as of the end of the second quarter, and are 
expressed in 2001 dollars.  The panel contains 13,424 annual observations, and is an unbalanced 
panel because: (a) many new banks started up during the sample period, and (b) many banks 
exited the data set by failing, being acquired, or reaching the age of 21.  Table I shows summary 
statistics for the data set used in the regression tests.   
 
III.C  Regression results 
Table II displays the regression estimates.  There is significant evidence that the 
relationship between start-up banks and small business borrowers has evolved with recent 
changes in the banking environment.  Consistent with the findings of DeYoung, Goldberg, and 
White (1999), the coefficient on AGE is negative and significant in all four regressions, evidence 
that small business lending gradually declines in importance for newly chartered banks as they 
mature.  For the new banks in the entire sample – which were chartered anywhere between the 
years 1973 and 2000 – the ratio of small business loans-to-assets declines by about 10 basis 
points, and the ratio of small business loans-to-total loans declines by about 20 basis points, 
when the average bank grows one year older.   
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However, there is clear evidence that small business lending declined even more rapidly 
with age for new banks chartered during the 1990s.  The coefficients on the AGE*POST 
interaction variables are generally negative and significant.  SBL/ASSETS fell about twice as 
fast with bank age (for example,  
-.0014 plus -.0011 in regression [2]), and SBL/LOANS fell about three times as fast with bank 
age (for example, -.0018 plus -.0036 in regression [3]) for banks chartered in the 1990s.  
Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficients on the POST dummy variables indicate that 
small business lending has become a more important entry strategy for banks chartered during 
the 1990s.  Setting AGE=0 and POST94=1 in regressions [1] and [3] shows that the typical new 
bank chartered after 1994 started out with 187 basis points higher SBL/ASSETS, and 474 basis 
points higher SBL/LOANS, than the typical new bank chartered before 1995.  This effect is 
similar, though less dramatic, in regressions [2] and [4] for POST89.     
The coefficients on ASSETS and ASSETS*POST reveal similar patterns for the 
relationship between small business lending and bank size.  Consistent with previous research 
findings, small business lending declines at the average new bank in the sample as it gets larger; 
for example, in regression [1] the coefficient on ASSETS indicates that SBL/ASSETS declines 
by about 50 basis points when the assets of the average bank grow by $1 million.  But for new 
banks chartered after 1994, the coefficient on ASSETS*POST94 indicates that the size-based 
decline in small business lending is five times faster (that is, -.0248 versus -.0049).   
 
IV.  Conclusions 
The analysis performed here suggests that small business lending has become a more 
important entry strategy for new banks that started up during the 1990s.  This is likely a 
reflection of the massive consolidation and restructuring of the banking industry during the past 
decade, and the opportunities that this has created for new entry – i.e., the displacement of small 
depositors, small business credit relationships, and small bank credit officers in the aftermath of 
geographic-expansion mergers.  Put simply, small business lending became an easier entry 
strategy for new banks during the 1990s as the ready supplies of these three crucial inputs 
increased.    
The analysis also suggests that new banks that started up during the 1990s moved away 
from their small business lending strategies more quickly than start-up banks in the past.  This is 
likely because deregulation (which increased banks‟ abilities to expand geographically) and new 
banking and information technologies (e.g., Internet banking, credit scoring) have allowed banks 
of all sizes to grow faster.  As new bank start-ups grow faster, they can more quickly escape the 
constraints that had previously limited their commercial lending opportunities to small firms.     
Against this backdrop, it is instructive that large banks have substantially increased their 
market share of small business loans over the past decade, while the market share held by 
community banks has substantially decreased.  This suggests that community banks‟ traditional 
comparative advantage at gathering information from small local businesses is eroding, at least 
to some extent because of large banks‟ use of new information technologies and financial 
techniques.   
Considering all of this evidence together suggests that the traditional symbiotic 
relationship between new banking ventures and small business ventures is weakening.  New 
banking ventures are depending more on small business loans as an entry vehicle, but are 
abandoning their small business strategies earlier in their lives.  On the other side of the 
relationship, small business borrowers are depending more on large banks for credit.    
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TABLE I 
 
Summary Statistics.  Data is an unbalanced panel of 13,424 annual observations of U.S. 
commercial banks during the 1993 through 2001 time period.  For an annual observation to be 
included in the data set, the bank had to be located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), had 
to be between 1 and 20-years old, had to have positive amounts of loans and assets, and complete 
data for all of the regression variables had to be available.  All variables are observed as of the 
end of the second quarter, and are expressed in 2001 dollars.  SBL = commercial and industrial 
loans with original principal less than $1 million.  ASSETS = total bank assets.  LOANS =  total 
loans and leases.  (Note: LOANS/ASSETS can be greater than 1.0 because LOANS is measured 
prior to deductions for expected loan losses.)  AGE = bank age in years (e.g., AGE = 1 for banks 
that are between 6 and 18 months old).  ASSETGROWTH = percent change in ASSETS from 
year earlier levels.  (Note: The values of ASSETGROWTH are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th 
percentiles of the sample distribution.)  MBHC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is an 
affiliate in a multibank holding company in the year of observation.  MBHCYEAR1 is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the bank began its life as an affiliate of a multibank holding company.  
HERFINDAHL = the deposit-based Herfindahl index in the bank‟s home MSA.  YEAR93 
through YEAR01 are dummy variables equal to 1 for observations from the years 1993 through 
2001, respectively.  
 
 mean std. dev. minimum maximum 
 
SBL/ASSETS .1022 .0913 0.0000 .6938 
SBL/LOANS .1653 .1435 0.0000 1.0000 
AGE (in years)  9.56 5.45 1 20 
ASSETS ($ millions) $325.76 $1,707.13 $2.12 $49,093.71 
LOANS/ASSETS  .6164 .1572 .0001 1.0369 
ASSETGROWTH   .2022 .4021 -.2900 2.4600 
MBHC .2186 .4133 0 1 
MBHCYEAR1 .0114 .1062 0 1 
HERFINDAHL .1128 .0504 .0247 .3514 
YEAR93 .1383 .3452 0 1 
YEAR94 .1249 .3306 0 1 
YEAR95 .1133 .3170 0 1 
YEAR96 .1056 .3074 0 1 
YEAR97 .1021 .3027 0 1 
YEAR98 .1025 .3033 0 1 
YEAR99 .1015 .3019 0 1 
YEAR00 .1053 .3070 0 1 
YEAR01 .1066 .3086 0 1 
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TABLE II 
 
OLS Estimates of Equation (1).  Data is an unbalanced panel of 13,424 annual observations of 
U.S. commercial banks during the 1993 through 2001 time period.  POST89 and POST94 are 
dummy variables equal to one for banks that were chartered after 1989 and 1994, respectively.  
All other variables are defined in Table I.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The 
standard errors of the coefficient estimates appear in parentheses.  (Note: The estimated 
coefficients for the YEAR fixed effects variables are suppressed.) 
 
     [1]     [2]     [3]     [4] 
 
dependent variable: 
 
SBL/Assets 
 
SBL/Assets 
 
SBL/Loans 
 
SBL/Loans 
     
INTERCEPT  .0396***  .0520***  .1954***  .2126*** 
 (.0052) (.0056) (.0084) (.0090) 
AGE -.0010*** -.0014*** -.0018*** -.0023*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0004) 
AGE*POST94  .0019     -- -.0036*     -- 
 (.0014)     -- (.0020)     -- 
AGE*POST89     -- -.0011*     -- -.0037*** 
     -- (.0006)     -- (.0009) 
ASSETS -.0049*** -.0044*** -.0068*** -.0058*** 
 (.0004) (.0005) (.0007) (.0008) 
ASSETS*POST94 -.0248***     -- -.0325***     -- 
 (.0030)     -- (.0048)     -- 
ASSETS*POST89     -- -.0052***     -- -.0083*** 
     -- (.0011)     -- (.0018) 
POST94  .0187***     --  .0474***     -- 
 (.0046)     -- (.0075)     -- 
POST89     --  .0097**     --  .0257*** 
     -- (.0041)     -- (.0066) 
LOANS/ASSETS  .1352***  .1328***  .0077  .0031 
 (.0048) (.0048) (.0078) (.0078) 
ASSETGROWTH  .0023  .0029 -.0008  .0001 
 (.0020) (.0020) (.0032) (.0032) 
MBHC -.0205*** -.0218*** -.0364*** -.0384*** 
 (.0019) (.0019) (.0030) (.0030) 
MBHCYEAR1 -.0066 -.0095 -.0183 -.0183 
 (.0076) (.0075) (.0122) (.0120) 
HERFINDAHL -.0339** -.0294** -.0683*** -.0601** 
 (.0150) (.0151) (.0243) (.0244) 
 
R-square 
 
 .1205 
 
 .1152 
 
 .0666 
 
 .0629 
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SOURCE:   Reprinted from the Journal of Banking and Finance, volume 23, Robert DeYoung, 
Lawrence G. Goldberg, and Lawrence J. White, “Youth, Adolescence, and Maturity of Banks: 
Credit Availability to Small Business in an Era of Banking Consolidation,” pages 463-492, 
Copyright (1999), with permission form Elsevier Science. 
   
Figure 1
Percentage of Loans made to Small Businesses (%SBL)
at Small Urban Commercial Banks, 1994-1996.
Source:  DeYoung (1999).
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Figure 2 
Strategic Map of the Banking Industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  DeYoung, Robert, and William C. Hunter, “Deregulation, the Internet, and the 
Competitive Viability of Large Banks and Community Banks,” in The Future of Banking, pp. 
173-202, ed. Benton Gup, Westport, CT:  Quoram Books, 2003. 
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